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Abstract  
An overwhelming majority of Hungarian businesses are small and medium enterprises. They play a very important role 
in the economy. On the one hand, they provide more than two thirds of the economically active population with jobs, 
and on the other hand, they are responsible for 40 percent of total value added and for 20 percent of all exports. In stark 
contrast to their importance in the economy SMEs have to deal with severe frending shortages. Until very recently 
banks did not consider extending loans to small and medium enterprises an important strategic line of business. The 
study concerns itself with the financing of small and medium enterprises, their relationships with banks and aims to 
investigate possible development strategies based on various financing schemes. Businesses take out loans of different 
maturities to run their operations smoothly and to develop their activities, whereas such loans are secured by different 
sorts of collateral. Opening the market of mortgage loans for businesses would enhance the prospects of long-term 
financing for both debtors and creditors, thus facilitating faster growth on a more stable growth path. 
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Introduction1 
From 1996 to the turn of the century Hungary’s 
economy prospered. Economic growth was beyond 
5 percent for a number of years, industrial produc-
tion rose by double-digits and the balance of pay-
ments was in a good shape. Public finances were 
about to be balanced and both inflation and unem-
ployment declined. Real wages rose and consumption 
expanded. The most important feature was that eco-
nomic growth averaged at over 5 percent, keeping the 
balance of payments and the budget in equilibrium 
and putting the economy on track to meet the Maas-
tricht criteria. This impressive economic performance 
came to be known as the “Hungarian model”, dubbed 
so by the government. The optimistic view that Hun-
gary’s economy was on a stable and sustainable 
growth path became widely accepted.  
The restructuring of the economy, which was based 
largely upon attracting foreign capital, neared its 
end towards the second half of the 1990s. As for-
merly state-owned assets were sold off more and 
more, FDI influx declined. At the beginning of the 
new century both the budget and the balance of 
payments started to show signs of deterioration in 
both nominal and GDP-percentage terms. The joint 
occurrence of such circumstances will in general 
result in a deterioration of economic competitive-
ness and conjure up images of social tensions. 
In the year 2000 it became obvious that the main 
weakness of Hungary’s economy is that its growth 
was basically being determined by external re-
sources leading to ever increasing fiscal and mone-
tary imbalances in nominal terms. In addition to that 
the uneven distribution of social burdens would lead 
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to social tensions. Although the development of the 
Maastricht based indicators and real flows were still 
widely deemed to be favorable, both the government 
and its critics realized that as a consequence of the 
adverse phenomena in the global economy and a 
domestic monetary policy hardly capable of acting 
as a strong defence, foreign direct investment, 
largely responsible for economic growth, could 
come to a halt. The straightforward consequence of 
that would be growing economic tensions and struc-
tural unemployment. 
In Central Europe the 1990s were a period of eco-
nomic transition. By the second half of that decade, 
as privatization and company reorganizations were 
by and large over the new private ownership structure 
began to take shape. In this region a very characteris-
tic post-socialist ownership structure prevailed. 
A major portion of the Gross Domestic Product was 
and still is being produced by multinational firms 
operating in duty-free zones. Small and medium 
enterprises, large in number though, did not play a 
major role in growth. Upon the fall of communism 
proprietors of small and medium enterprises were 
endowed with scarce resources only, while unevenly 
distributed and uncoordinated fiscal and tax policies 
in subsequent years did not contribute much in the 
way of promoting such businesses either. 
It is very alarming that multinational firms, while 
their propensity to invest actively is in steady de-
cline, do not have strong ties to domestic manufac-
turers and customers. In order to maintain their level 
of competitiveness and capital income multination-
als started to shift their operations to areas outside 
Central Europe, to places such as Ukraine, Romania, 
China, etc. In doing so their considerations were 
centred around the question of specific wages in 
labor-intensive industries – favorable at the time of 
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setting up operations but no more – and the increas-
ing saturation of local markets with the products 
they churn out. 
The role of small and medium enterprises is vital in 
any economy. On the one hand, because they pro-
vide jobs to a great deal of the economically active 
population, on the other hand, because of their con-
tribution to the Gross Domestic Product and to ex-
ports, and thirdly, because they are typically owned 
by domestic entrepreneurs. 
Financial institutions tended to neglect advancing 
loans to this sector because of its relative riskiness. 
Due to high interest rates and high levels of inflation 
SMEs were forced to fund their operations by with-
holding profits. Under the current set of economic 
circumstances, however, banks are becoming in-
creasingly interested in financing SMEs, since this 
is a relatively new market with high borrowing ca-
pacity. On the other hand, such businesses find 
themselves more and more in the borrowing posi-
tion as they cannot fully fund their investments by 
retained earnings. 
Our study concerns itself with the financing of small 
and medium enterprises, their relationships with 
banks and aims to investigate possible development 
strategies based on various financing schemes. 
1. Small and medium enterprises in Hungary 
An overwhelming majority (99 percent) of Hungar-
ian businesses are small and medium enterprises1, 
while 66 percent of all enterprises are sole proprie-
torships. More than two thirds of the economically 
active population are employed by such enterprises. 
The SME-sector is responsible for 40 percent of 
total value added and for 20 percent of all exports. 
In stark contrast to their importance in the economy 
SMEs have to deal with severe funding shortages. 
Until very recently banks did not consider extending 
loans to SMEs an important strategic line of business. 
In the past few years, however, the financing activi-
ties of banks directed at SMEs have multiplied.  
Since 2000 one could observe a sudden shift of in-
terest towards SMEs. Loans extended to such busi-
nesses rose by 500 percent between 1999 and 2006.  
                                                 
1 In Hungary the concept of small and medium enterprises is defined by 
law (Act No. CXV of 1999 on Small and Medium Enterprises and the 
Promotion of their Development). Pursuant to the provisions of this Act 
the employment thresholds are identical with those set out in the rele-
vant EU-regulations (the total number of employees not exceeding 250), 
while financial thresholds were set considerably lower. In Hungary 
a company is qualified as a small or medium enterprise if the vol-
ume of its annual sales does not exceed 4 billion Forints or its total 
assets (balance sheet total) do not exceed 2.7 billion Forints. In the 
EU the respective limits are 40 million Euros of annual sales or 27 
million Euros of total assets (that is the upper limit is 2.4-fold of the 
Hungarian upper limit). 
Table 1. Loans extended to micro-, small and  
medium enterprises (in billion Forints) 
2004 2005 
Type of 
enterprise 1999 Cumulative 
lending 
Change 
from 
prior 
year 
(%) 
Cumulative 
lending 
Change 
from 
prior 
year 
(%) 
Micro-
enterprises 112.7 747.3 663.1 897.8 796.6 
Small 
enterprises 110.6 456.5 412.8 929.7 840.6 
Medium 
enterprises 237.7 1021.6 429.8 970.2 408.1 
Total 461.0 2225.5 482.7 2797.7 606.9 
Source: Péter Bilek, Tamás Borkó, Veronika Czakó, Gábor 
Pellényi. SME financing between 2000-2005. International 
Center for Economic Growth, Európai Központ, 2006. 
2. The prospects of SME financing in Hungary 
The Hungarian financial system heavily relies on 
banks to provide funds to the economy, whereas in 
this respect the role of capital markets is negligible. 
Total market capitalization as a percentage of GDP 
amounts to less than 50 percent of the average of 
EMU countries, the financial systems of which also 
largely rely on banks. Especially the corporate bond 
market is underdeveloped. 
We expect the banking sector to dominate the mar-
ket for funding the corporate sector, mainly because 
of the limitations impeding the development of the 
domestic capital market. Since Hungarian firms are 
rather small, issuing and floating shares is an expen-
sive option compared to taking out loans from 
banks. The indebtedness of the Hungarian corporate 
sector lags behind that of developed countries, al-
though leverage increased sharply between 1995 
and 1999 and is now close to the level in some 
European countries. Cross-country comparisons of 
lending by the banking sector as a percentage of 
GDP, however, show that the indebtedness of Hun-
garian businesses with loans is far below the aver-
age of Eurozone. 
Table 2. Loans extended to Hungarian businesses by 
domestic banks as a percentage of GDP in 2005 
Country, region Bank loans as % of GDP 
European Union 43 
Hungary 26 
Source: Péter Bilek, Tamás Borkó, Veronika Czakó, Gábor 
Pellényi. SME financing between 2000-2005. International 
Center for Economic Growth, Európai Központ, 2006. 
Once we take into account direct foreign borrow-
ings, however, we arrive at a far higher level of 
indebtedness. In this instance the level of lending to 
Hungarian businesses already closes to the Euro-
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pean average. We get a yet more precise impression 
if we account for the high level of foreign owner-
ship in the corporate sector. 
As we are entering a favorable phase of the eco-
nomic cycle and Hungary’s economy is starting to 
get in better shape we may expect further increases 
in the level of indebtedness of the corporate sector. 
Nevertheless there are some factors reducing the 
importance of foreign borrowing, such as higher 
exchange rate risk due to widened fluctuation mar-
gins and the cost of managing that risk, the gradual 
evolution of syndicated loan schemes servicing big 
borrowers and the declining cost associated with 
mandatory reserve requirements 
On the other hand, there are forces counteracting 
these tendencies. A sharp decline of foreign borrow-
ing is unlikely to happen as the subsidiaries of mul-
tinationals are inclined to borrow directly from their 
parent companies’ foreign-based banks for reasons 
such as tax and earnings optimization, higher credit-
lines or the parent company’s strategy. We may 
rightly expect businesses focusing mainly on do-
mestic markets to pursue different financing strate-
gies than those relying heavily on exports, for a 
great deal of companies does not wish to manage 
increased exchange rate risk for the time being if 
that can be averted. Shareholders’ loans are going to 
continue to play a vital role in providing funds to 
businesses due to the high presence and importance 
of multinational firms.  
3. The business environment in which small and 
medium enterprises operate 
The role foreign direct investment has been playing in 
Hungary’s economic development and in the transition 
process towards market economy can hardly be over-
estimated. It is largely due to the fact that Hungary’s 
share in global trade has doubled in the past decade. 
Economic history shows that in the past fifty years 
there has been a close correlation between the speed of 
catching up and modernization of less developed coun-
tries and the frequency and magnitude of foreign capi-
tal inflow. It is verifiable that countries that were iso-
lated from international capital flows have increasingly 
been at disadvantage and banished into marginal posi-
tions. Until the mid-1990s Hungary attracted the lion’s 
share of foreign direct investment among post-socialist 
countries, as more than 50 percent of active capital 
investments were made in this country. By 2001 this 
cumulative value has declined to 25 percent. One has 
to bear in mind that the conditions to carry out foreign 
direct investment were the most favorable when mass 
privatization peaked. Neighboring countries started 
their respective privatizations attracting large amounts 
of capital investment only after the turn of the century, 
at a time when privatization in Hungary was by and 
large over.  
Thus the competitive advantage stemming from the 
dynamics of foreign direct investment that Hungary 
enjoyed over its competitors until 1998 and – as far 
as its mid-term beneficial consequences are con-
cerned – until the turn of the century has been van-
ishing from that time on. One case in point is the 
adverse development of foreign direct investment 
since 2002 compared to prior periods.  
The change of government in 2002 meant yet another 
change in economic policy showing the unfortunate 
dependence of the economy on the political cycle, 
resulting in a somewhat “zigzagged” path. The “Szé-
chenyi National Development Scheme” introduced 
by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s government was 
gradually phazed out and most of the calls under that 
scheme were declared closed. To replace that pro-
gramme, in autumn 2002 the new government elabo-
rated and submitted to Parliament its new “Smart 
Hungary” scheme aimed at spurring business invest-
ments. The goals of this scheme were to restore in-
vestor confidence, give a new impetus to investment, 
fasten the growth rate of investment spending and to 
attract new investors. To achieve this set of goals 
businesses had to be persuaded to plough back their 
earnings, that is to invest, and to make better use of 
Hungary’s R&D and innovation capacities. The ma-
jor goal of the scheme is to achieve faster growth in 
industrial investment spending and to contribute to 
the development of strategic services, making multi-
national firms set up their regional operations and 
headquarters in Hungary. Another priority is to help 
less developed areas with a high rate of unemploy-
ment to attract investments. 
The scheme focuses on three priorities. On the one 
hand, the elaboration of a tax-incentive scheme in line 
with the relevant EU-regulations, targeted budget 
funding for some special areas of interest and making 
the procedures of authorities more business-friendly. 
Both the continued efforts taken in the past fifteen 
years of economic transition to introduce sweeping 
reforms aimed at consolidating public finances and 
more recent measures taken in order to achieve com-
pliance with the Maastricht and Copenhagen criteria 
are severely flawed, as is the Smart Hungary scheme, 
being based on such efforts and reforms. It is a funda-
mental problem that the fiscal and monetary environ-
ment in which both domestic and foreign businesses 
are operating holds a number of unknowns and uncer-
tainties. Measures of the Central Bank aimed at fight-
ing inflation will in the short-run deteriorate the inter-
national competitiveness of domestic companies in an 
environment of deepening fiscal problems. The budget 
deficit is soaring on end, which will sooner or later 
adversely affect the inflation rate. Both monetary and 
fiscal indicators were dismal in 2006, which fits in 
with recent years’ worsening trends. 
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The projected budget deficit for 2006 was five hun-
dred billion Forints, reaching one-and-a-half billion 
Forints at the end of the year. Using the Maastricht 
method of determining the budget deficit the latter 
amounted to 9.6 percent instead of the 3 percent pre-
scribed by the Maastricht criteria. As far as the social 
insurance funds are concerned the “customary” deficit 
of forty billion Forints which planners, though con-
scious of the fact it would eventually be exceeded, 
have been taking as a basis in prior year was replaced 
by a projected deficit of 250 billion Forints. 
4. Agricultural mortgage loans in Hungary 
One of the main characteristics of economic activity 
is the continuous use of credit. Businesses take out 
loans of different maturities to run their operations 
smoothly and to develop their activities, whereas 
such loans are secured by different sorts of collat-
eral. In many instances the debt capital employed in 
businesses far exceeds equity. 
Increasing the role of agricultural mortgage loans 
would surely alleviate the financing problems encoun-
tered by the Hungarian agricultural sector. Opening the 
market of mortgage loans for agricultural businesses 
would enhance the prospects of long-term financing 
for both debtors and creditors, thus facilitating faster 
growth on a more stable growth path.  
As the case is, the maximum amount lent is deter-
mined, on the one hand, by the fair market value of 
agricultural land pledged as collateral and, on the 
other hand, by the borrowing requirements of the 
agricultural sector. On the financial institutions’ 
side, however, the amount lent is going to be deter-
mined by the solvency of the agricultural sector as a 
whole and by the demand for mortgage debentures. 
Thus mortgage lending in agriculture hinges on the 
conditions prevailing in the market for agricultural 
land, in the profitability of the agricultural sector 
and on financial markets. 
This sort of lending would enable financial institutions 
to extend high volume loans, which at the same time 
are low risk. The fair market value of one hectare of 
agricultural land would typically be between 100,000 
and 800,000 Forints, which is a considerable amount 
of money, even if we bear in mind that the price of 
agricultural land is rather depressed. Taking an aver-
age price of 200,000 Forints/hectare the fair market 
value of the 4.3 million hectares of agricultural land – 
based on which the EU-funding of the sector was de-
termined – adds up to 860 billion Forints1. 
Again, on the financial institutions’ side this sort of 
                                                 
1 The total area of land in agricultural use is 6.1 million hectares, of 
which: 4.7 million hectares are arable land, 0.1 million hectares are 
gardens, 0.1 million hectares are orchards and 1.1 hectares are lawn. 
Taking the area of 6.1 million hectares as a possible collateral, the total 
loans that could be extended would be as high as 1,202 billion Forints.  
lending is associated with lower risk than average 
market risk, since land, as a factor of production, is not 
subject to depreciation. With careful and proper culti-
vation and farming its value can even be increased.  
The prudential regulation of the operations of finan-
cial institutions specialized in extending mortgage 
loans encompasses legislation on: 
♦ the capital adequacy requirements towards such 
financial institutions; 
♦ limitations applying to their investments; 
♦ collateral; and 
♦ continuous control2. 
Legislation on capital adequacy requirements ap-
plies, on the one hand, to the minimum amount of 
authorized share capital necessary to set up a finan-
cial institution as well as to obtain the operating 
license, and, on the other hand, to the desired levels 
of the solvency ratio and capital adequacy ratio 
while carrying out operations. 
Act No. XXX of 1997 on Mortgage Banks and 
Mortgage Debentures stipulates that the authorized 
share capital of mortgage banks must be at least 3 
billion Forints, to be paid in cash in full3. 
The other element of capital adequacy regulations 
that banks must observe are the provisions on the 
capital adequacy ratio.  
This ratio gauges solvency and is closely related to 
the risks of lending, since in its denominator we 
have the bank’s assets less accruals and impairment 
losses adjusted for risk. Thus the amount in the de-
nominator is the bank’s total lending net of the ac-
cruals/provisions (impairment losses) created at the 
expense of the interest spread, that is, the amount 
net of the expected credit (repayment) risk4. The 
sum in the numerator is the respective mortgage 
bank’s liable equity capital. Pursuant to the provi-
sions of the Banking Act the ratio thus calculated 
shall be at least 8 percent. This requirement 
brings to bear the legislators’ intentions on the 
issue, holding that a bank’s operations are deemed 
                                                 
2 Act No. XXX of 1997 on “Mortgage Banks and Mortgage Debentures”. 
3 Act CXII of 1996 stipulates that the minimum authorized share capital 
of banks must be 2 billion Forints, with an additional 1 billion Forints in 
case of specialized financial institutions. The authorized share capital of 
savings co-operatives must be at least 100 million Forints. 
4 There are two types of credit risk: 
♦ The expected risk characteristic of distinguished groups of bor-
rowers observed in prior periods. Banks have to create so called 
risk-provisions/accruals, whereas the cost associated with creating 
such reserves has to be covered by revenues from the risk pre-
mium. As a consequence of new accounting rules the creation of 
risk accruals/provisions was replaced by impairment losses as of 
January 1, 2001. 
♦ Idiosyncratic or non-systematic risks are such resulting from 
shocks or recessions affecting markets, regions or economies as a 
whole. In such instances the risk premium does not provide any 
protection. In order to fend off losses due to such occurrences 
banks have to meet certain capital requirement criteria.  
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to be safe from the point of view of its solvency, 
if after creating the provisions/accruals to cover 
expected losses it still disposes of equity capital 
equivalent to 8 percent of its total lending net of 
such provisions. 
Section 23 of Act No. XXX of 1997 on Mortgage 
Banks and Mortgage Debentures stipulates that the 
Financial Supervisory Authority may order the re-
spective mortgage bank to transfer its mortgage loan 
portfolio and additional collateral if its capital ade-
quacy ratio falls below four percent for a period 
exceeding ninety days and if it cannot restore the 
adequate level within the time interval prescribed by 
the Authority. 
The Act on Mortgage Banks and Mortgage Deben-
tures contains provisions as to the maximum amount 
lent as well. Pursuant to the regulations contained 
therein the amount of the loan extended must not 
exceed seventy percent of the fair market value of 
the collateral. Mortgage banks must at all times 
dispose of such amount equivalent to the out-
standing face value and interest of mortgage deben-
tures in circulation. 
Procedures applying to the determination of the 
value of the collateral are prescribed by law. 
Upon determining this value banks base their con-
siderations on a so-called “emergency sales 
price”, a price they can obtain with a high prob-
ability under any set of circumstances. In the end 
the sum borrowed will be around half the fair 
market price of the real property encumbered by 
mortgage. 
Act No. XXX of 1997 puts a strong restriction on 
mortgage banks’ ability to acquire land: it pre-
scribes that such banks may acquire real property 
(except for property necessary for that bank’s 
operations) in order to avert losses from providing 
financial services only by way of bankruptcy or 
liquidation proceedings. Once acquired, such land 
must be sold by public auction within three years. 
A further limitation is that a mortgage bank’s 
cumulative share in companies thus acquired may 
not exceed ten percent of its liable equity capital1 
and that the sum of its investments in real prop-
erty may not exceed five percent of its liable eq-
uity capital2. 
The regulation of mortgage bank operations and 
mortgage debentures by law puts such banks in a 
                                                 
1 The total net lending of the financial institution may not exceed 100 
percent of its liable equity capital. Act CXII of 1996 on Financial 
Institutions and Financial Enterprises, Section 85. 
2 The same applies to financial institutions. Section 84 of the Act quoted 
above. 
position to operate safely in the long run and en-
sures an adequate level of solvency. Mortgage loans 
are a type of loan providing financial institutions 
with profits at below-average risk levels. 
Agricultural businesses have been able to take ad-
vantage of such loans since 1989 when the Mort-
gage Credit and Lien Bank was first set up. From 
2003 onwards commercial banks have started ex-
tending mortgage loans. This was made possible by 
the fact that the National Land Trust assumed the 
obligation3 to take over the land of debtors default-
ing on their loans4. 
At present businesses do not take a keen interest 
in taking out mortgage loans. The sum of all 
mortgage loans extended by the Mortgage Credit 
and Lien Bank has not exceeded 1 billion Forints 
to date. Nor is the new type of mortgage loan in-
troduced in 2003 very appealing. For one thing, 
high interest rates are to blame. Interest rates as 
high as 14-15 percent, though pushed down to 8-9 
percent in the case of subsidized soft loans, are 
way to high for agricultural businesses operating 
on low returns and profitability. On the other 
hand, in case of the agricultural sector the titles of 
actual ownership and legal use of land are sepa-
rated, causing confusion on the market for agri-
cultural land. Then there is the fact that leases are 
usually not long-term, making it difficult for 
mortgage loans based on leasehold relationships 
to establish themselves as a solid form of financ-
ing. An accord between lessor and lessee would 
be needed to apply for a mortgage loan. In Hun-
gary 56.9 percent of agricultural land is used as 
leaseholds, whereas in the case of arable land this 
ratio is as high as 68.8 percent. Thirdly, the sheer 
size of so-called micro-estates does not allow the 
proprietors to take out loans. The average size of 
land cultivated by individual farmers is 4.5 hec-
tares. 45.1 percent of all agricultural land is being 
cultivated by such farmers. This group of proprie-
tors is not credit-worthy5. 
                                                 
3 Banks, being companies, are not allowed to own land. Under the 
current set of economic circumstances land auctions are associated with 
considerable uncertainty. 
4 On the condition that the market value of the estate was estab-
lished by a real-estate valuer approved by the National Land Trust 
and that the market value of the estate has not changed considerably 
in the meantime. 
5 The portion of those farming on farmland of over 50 hectares is less 
than one percent of individual farmers. 
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